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Theorems of Tarski’s Undefinability and
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness—Computationally
Abstract
We present a version of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent
extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the deriv-
ability conditions (first discussed by M. Detlefsen 2001). We also argue that Tarski’s theorem on the
Undefinability of Truth is Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem relativized to definable oracles; here
a unification of these two theorems is given.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we will argue that Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of Truth in sufficiently expressive
languages, which on its face value has nothing to do with (oracle) computations, is equivalent with Gödel’s
(semantic form of the) first incompleteness theorem relativized to definable oracles. Actually, we will
show a theorem which unifies the theorems of Gödel and Tarski. Then we will discuss Gödel’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem. Since this theorem, inability of sufficiently strong theories to prove (a statement
of) their own consistency, is not robust with respect to the notion of consistency, its proof is much more
delicate and elegant than the proof of the first theorem; indeed the proof appears in very few places
(see [9] a review of the first edition of [12]). Though, some book proofs (in the words of Paul Erdős)
for the first incompleteness theorem exist in the literature, a nice and neat proof (understandable to the
undergraduates or amateur mathematicians) for the second theorem is missing. Here, we will present a
proof for this theorem from computational viewpoint which will be based on some bitheoretic derivability
conditions, first introduced by Detlefsen [2].
2 Unifying Theorems of Gödel and Tarski
Here we examine the relation between Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (in its weaker semantic form)
and Tarski’s Theorem on the Undefinability of Truth; indeed, we prove a theorem which unifies these two.
2.1 Finitely Given Infinite Sets (of Natural Numbers)
How can an infinite set (such as {0, 3, 6, 9, · · · , 3k, · · · } or {0, 1, 4, 9, · · · , k2, · · · }) be finitely given? (We
consider sets of natural numbers, i.e., subsets of N, throughout the paper). There are a few definitions for
this concept in the literature such as:
• A set D(⊆ N) is decidable when there exists a single-input and Boolean-output algorithm which on
any input x(∈ N) outputs Yes if x ∈ D and outputs No if x 6∈ D.
• A set R(⊆ N) is called recursively enumerable (re for short) when there exists an input-free algorithm
which outputs (generates) the elements of R (after running).
• A set S(⊆ N) is semi-decidable when there exists a single-input and output-free algorithm which
after running on an input x ∈ N halts if and only if x ∈ S (and so when x 6∈ S the algorithms runs
forever on input x).
Two deep theorems of Computability Theory (see e.g. [3]) state that
 semi-decidability is equivalent to being an re set, and
 decidability is equivalent to recursively enumerability of a set and its complement.
Fix a (sufficiently expressive) language of arithmetic, like {0, S,+,×,6} (as in [4]) or {0, 1,+,×, <}
(as in [6]), and denote by N the structure of N by this language, so that N |= ϕ makes the sense that the
sentence ϕ (in this language of arithmetic) holds true in the set of natural numbers (equipped with this
language of arithmetic by their standard interpretations).
• A set A(⊆ N) is definable when there exists a formula ϕ(x), in the language of arithmetic, such that
A = {n ∈ N | N |= ϕ(n)}, where the term n represents n in the language of arithmetic (which could
be S · · ·S(0) or 1 + · · ·+ 1 [for n-times]).
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Definition 2.1 The classes of formulas {Σn}n∈N and {Πn}n∈N are defined in the standard way [4, 6]:
Σ0 = Π0 is the class of bounded formulas (in which every universal quantifier has the form ∀x([x 6 t→ · · · ]
and every existential quantifier has the form ∃x[x 6 t∧ · · · ] for some term t), and the class Σn+1 contains
the closure of Πn under the existential quantifiers, and is closed under disjunction, conjunction, existential
quantifiers and bounded universal quantifiers; similarly, the class Πn+1 contains the closure of Σn under
the universal quantifiers, and is closed under disjunction, conjunction, universal quantifiers and bounded
existential quantifiers. Let us also define ∆n = Σn ∩ Πn and note that the negation of a Σn-formula is a
Πn-formula, and vice versa. G
Another deep fact from Computability Theory (and Mathematical Logic) is that
 re sets are exactly the sets definable by Σ1-formulas.
And so, co-re sets are the ones definable by Π1-formulas, and then the decidable sets coincide with
∆1-definable sets. So, one can say that in a sense
Computability is Definability.
And conversely, definability is (relativized) computability (by oracles): since having an oracle for deciding the
arithmetical formula ϕ(x) we can decide whether given n belongs to the set defined by ϕ(x) or not (if ϕ(n)
holds then it does belong to the set and if ϕ(n) does not hold then n does not belong to the set).
Thus, by a finitely given (infinite) set we may mean a definable set, the complexity of whose definition
describes the complexity of the computation of the membership algorithm in that set.
2.2 Computability vs. Definability
Gödel’s First Incompleteness theorem in its weaker semantic form states that the set of all true arithmetical
sentences Th(N ) (see the definition below) is not decidable. It immediately follows that this set is not
re, since otherwise its complement, noting that Th(N ){ = {¬θ | θ ∈ Th(N )}, would be re too, and
thus Th(N ) would be re and co-re and whence decidable! Hence, in the semantic form Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorems states that Th(N ) 6∈ Σ1 (by abusing the notation we may denote by Σn the class
of Σn-formulas and also the class of definable sets by some Σn-formulas). Syntactically, this theorem of
Gödel is usually stated as “no sound and re extension of Peano’s Arithmetic can be complete”; in notation
(where PA denotes Peano’s Arithmetic) PA ⊆ T & T ∈Σ1 & T ⊆ Th(N ) =⇒ T 6= Th(N ).
Definition 2.2 The set of all true arithmetical sentences is
Th(N ) = {θ ∈ Arithmeical Sentences | N |= θ}.
For any n, the set of all true arithmetical Σn-sentences is
Σn-Th(N ) = {θ∈Σn-Sentences | N |= θ}.
Also, the set of all true arithmetical Πn-sentences is
Πn-Th(N ) = {θ∈Πn-Sentences | N |= θ}. G
Still, a more precise reading of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is:
(?) PA ⊆ T & T ∈ Σ1 & T ⊆ Th(N ) =⇒ Π1-Th(N ) 6⊆ T
since Gödel’s true but unprovable (in T ) sentence is indeed Π1.
Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth states that Th(N ) is not definable. For this theorem
to make sense we should view Th(N ) as a set of natural numbers, and this is done by a fixed (standard)
Gödel numbering of syntax. Let pαq denote the Gödel number of the object α. So, (again by abusing
the notation) identifying the set of natural numbers {pθq | θ ∈ Arith. Sent. & N |= θ} with Th(N ),
we can talk about definability or undefinability of Th(N ). So, Tarski’s theorem states that for any n,
Th(N ) 6∈ Σn. For the sake of unifying it with Gödel’s theorem let us present this theorem as
(∗)n PA ⊆ T & T ∈ Σn & T ⊆ Th(N ) =⇒ Th(N ) 6⊆ T
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stating that “no definable and sound extension of PA can be complete”. Compare with Gödel’s theorem
stated above: “no Σ1-definable and sound extension of PA can be Π1-complete”.
Theorem 2.3 ([11]) No Σn-definable and sound extension of PA is Πn-complete (for any n>0).
(>)n PA ⊆ T & T ∈ Σn & T ⊆ Th(N ) =⇒ Πn-Th(N ) 6⊆ T
Proof. If T is Σn-definable then so is its provability predicate PrT (x). By (Gödel-Carnap’s) Diagonal
Lemma there exists an arithmetical sentence γ such that the equivalence PA ` γ ←→ ¬PrT (pγq) holds.
This sentence γ is equivalently a Πn-sentence (and even can be explicitly constructed to be so). Now, we
show that N |= γ. Since, otherwise (if N |= ¬γ then) N |= PrT (pγq) and so T ` γ, but this contradicts
the soundness of T . So, γ ∈ Πn-Th(N ). Finally, we show that T 6` γ. Because, if T ` γ then (by PA ⊆ T )
T ` ¬PrT (pγq) and so (by soundness of T ) N |= ¬PrT (pγq); whence T 6` γ, contradiction. o
Remark 2.4 Obviously, (>)1 is the same as (?), and also (>)n implies (∗)n for every n > 0. Thus,
Theorem 2.3 implies Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (for n = 1) and also Tarski’s Theorem on the
Undefinability of Truth. G
3 Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem states that sufficiently strong theories (in sufficiently expressive
languages) cannot prove their own consistency. To make it more precise, it should read as: for a sufficiently
strong theory in a sufficiently expressive language there exists a sentence which expresses the consistency
of the theory (in a way or another) which is not provable from the theory.
A classical proof of this theorem (which is not its only proof) goes roughly as:
—–First, the consistency statement ConT of a theory T comes from a provability predicate PrT of that
theory by the definition ¬PrT (p⊥q) where ⊥ is a contradictory statement such as t 6= t for a term t in the
language of T .
—–Second, this provability predicate should satisfy some conditions, the most famous of which are the
following which are known as Hilbert-Bernays-Löb provability (or derivability) conditions: for any ϕ, ψ,
(i) T ` PrT (pϕq) if T ` ϕ;
(ii) T ` PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)
]
;
(iii) T ` PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pPrT (pϕq)q).
These conditions translate nicely to the language of modal logic when  is interpreted as provability:
(i) is the same as the necessitation rule ϕ/ϕ,
(ii) is the same as the Kripke’s distribution axiom (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ),
(iii) is the same as what is called the 4 axiom in modal logic ϕ→ ϕ.
—–Third, finally, the classical proof uses Diagonal Lemma, just like the proof of Gödel’s First Incomplete-
ness Theorem, for the formula PrT (pξq) → ⊥ to get a formula G which satisfies the following provable
equivalence
(d) T ` G ←→ [PrT (pG q)→ ⊥]
—–Then, for the sake of a contradiction, assuming that
(0) T ` Con(T )
the proof continues as (note that for inferring (1) and (5) we use the tautologies (¬A) ≡ (A → ⊥) and
A→ (B → C) ≡ (A→ B)→ (A→ C), respectively):
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(1) T ` PrT (p⊥q)→ ⊥ by (0)
(2) T ` G → [PrT (pG q)→ ⊥] by (d)
(3) T ` PrT
(
pG → [PrT (pG q)→ ⊥]q) by (2),(i)
(4) T ` PrT (pG q)→
[
PrT
(
pPrT (pG q)q
)→ PrT (p⊥q)] by (3),(ii)
(5) T ` PrT (pG q)→ PrT (p⊥q) by (4),(iii)
(6) T ` PrT (pG q)→ ⊥ by (5),(1)
(7) T ` G by (6),(d)
(8) T ` PrT (pG q) by (7),(i)
(9) T ` ⊥ by (6),(8)
So, if T is consistent (and satisfies the provability conditions) then T 6` Con(T ).
As a matter of fact, the above proof proves much more than Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
If ⊥ is replaced with ϕ in (1)–(10) then Löb’s rule is derived: if T ` PrT (pϕq) → ϕ then T ` ϕ. This
implies that T ` H for any formula H which satisfies T ` H ↔ PrT (pHq), answering a question of Henkin.
Almost the same line of reasoning can show Löb’s Axiom:
T ` PrT
(
pPrT (pϕq)→ ϕq
)→ PrT (pϕq)
which immediately (by contraposition) implies the formalized form of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness
Theorem:
T ` Con(T∪{¬ϕ})→ ¬PrT∪{¬ϕ}
(
pCon(T∪{¬ϕ})q).
In particular for ϕ = ⊥ we get T ` Con(T ) → ¬PrT
(
pCon(T )q
)
which is exactly what Gödel’s second
incompleteness theorem states: if a theory is consistent (and satisfies some conditions) then it cannot
prove its own consistency. To emphasize the importance of this generalization and showing the strength of
this classical proof we present a proof for Löb’s axiom below: for a given sentence ϕ, by Diagonal Lemma,
there exists a sentence G such that
(d) T ` G ←→ [PrT (pG q)→ ϕ].
Now, we reason for the theory T̂ = T + PrT
(
pPrT (pϕq)→ ϕq
)
as follows
(1) T ` PrT
(
pG → [PrT (pG q)→ ϕ]q) by (d),(i)
(2) T ` PrT (pG q)→
[
PrT
(
pPrT (pG q)q
)→ PrT (pϕq)] by (1),(ii)
(3) T ` PrT (pG q)→ PrT (pϕq) by (3),(iii)
(4) T ` PrT
(
pPrT (pG q)→ PrT (pϕq)q
)
by (3),(i)
(5) T̂ ` PrT
(
pPrT (pG q)→ ϕq
)
by (4)&hyp.
(6) T ` PrT
(
p
[
PrT (pG q)→ ϕ
]→ G q) by (d),(i)
(7) T ` PrT
(
pPrT (pG q)→ ϕq
)→ PrT (pG q) by (6),(ii)
(8) T̂ ` PrT (pG q) by (5),(7)
(9) T̂ ` PrT (pϕq) by (3),(8)
Let us note that (5) follows from (4) and the hypothesis PrT
(
pPrT (pϕq)→ ϕq
)
with the following formula
which holds by (i) and (ii)
PrT (pA → Bq) −→
[
PrT (pB → Cq) −→ PrT (pA → Cq)
]
,
by putting A = PrT (pGq), B = PrT (pϕq), C = ϕ.
So, this argument which has become classical in modern textbooks (see [13] for a historical account
of Hilbert-Bernays-Löb provability conditions) is too strong; it can indeed prove a formalized version of
Gödel’s second theorem and even more. Another dilemma with this proof is that it appears in very few
places, since most of the authors know the proof through the provability conditions (i), (ii) and (iii).
Though (i) and (ii) can be proved rather easily, the proof of (iii) is rather rare (see [9]). Indeed, for (i) one
needs to know/show that
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• for any re theory T the formula PrT is Σ1;
• most natural theories, like PA, are Σ1-complete;
• so if T is an re theory containing PA then (i) holds for PrT .
For (ii) it suffices to note that if the formula ProofT (x, y) represents the statement “y is the Gödel number
of a proof in T of the formula with Gödel number x” (so PrT (x) ≡ ∃y ProofT (x, y) by definition) then (ii)
is equivalent to
ProofT (pϕ→ ψq, u) −→
[
ProofT (pϕq, v) −→ ∃wProofT (pψq, w)
]
.
Having u and v it is enough to take w as u_v_pψq where _ denotes concatenation (of strings). So, if
• T can prove the totality of concatenation, i.e., T ` ∀u, v∃w(u_v = w),
then (ii) holds for T .
But, as mentioned before, the proof of (iii) is rather technical and so appears in many few places. One
reason is that (iii) cannot be (easily) proved directly; indeed, its proof goes through proving the formalized
Σ1-completeness for the theory T :
(iv) T ` σ → PrT (pσq) for any Σ1-formula σ.
It is interesting to note that the third provability condition sometimes is taken to be (iv), rather than (iii)
which is a special case of (iv). All the existing proofs of (iii) indeed prove (iv). It is actually difficult to
prove T ` σ → PrT (pσq), for any Σ1-formula σ, for particular T ’s like PA. Let us note that (i),(ii), (iii)
and (iv) involve a kind of self-reference: the theory T can prove some statements about its own provability
predicate. The fundamental question here is that: does every proof of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness
Theorem have to go through proving (iii) or (iv)? Fortunately, the answer is no! and some beautiful
proofs of this theorem can be found in e.g. [1, 5, 7, 8] some of which even avoid the use of Diagonal
Lemma (cf. also [10] for a diagonal-free proof of Gödel-Rosser’s theorem).
3.1 Detlefsen’s Bi-Theoretic Derivability Conditions
“For certain purposes” in particular “for what is perhaps the most important philosophical application of”
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem “namely, that to Hilbert’s Program”, Detlefsen [2] introduced a
bitheoretic version of this theorem; a version “in which it is allowed that the representing and represented
theories be different.” Our remark above about the circularity of the derivability conditions (i,ii,iii,iv) was
based on the fact that a single theory does all the job: prove some facts about its own provability. For
example in (i) we have that T ` PrT (pϕq) whenever T ` ϕ. But the fact of the matter is that if T ` ϕ
then we also have that PA ` PrT (pϕq) (and so when PA ⊆ T we can conclude that T ` PrT (pϕq)). It seems
to us that the new bitheoretic condition
T ` ϕ =⇒ PA ` PrT (pϕq)
is somehow stronger than the monotheoretic condition
T ` ϕ =⇒ T ` PrT (pϕq)
even if we assume that PA ⊆ T . One reason is that in the monotheoretic version the theory T (itself)
should be Σ1-complete (be able to prove all true arithmetical Σ1-sentences) but in the bitheoretic version
the Σ1-completeness of a fixed theory (like PA or even its weak fragments) suffices. If that was sufficiently
interesting, let us now have a look at (ii): the sentence PrT (pϕ → ψq) →
[
PrT (pϕq) → PrT (pψq)
]
is
true for any sentences ϕ, ψ and any classical theory T . So, it must be provable in a sufficiently strong
arithmetical theory (like PA); whence we may have
PA ` PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)
]
for any re theory T . Let us note that here we do not require (and do not need) the theory T to contain
PA. Its strength over (ii) is more obvious.
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Other than the above mathematical interests in the bitheoretic versions of the derivability conditions,
Detlefsent [2] sees two important philosophical reasons for the importance of the bitheoretic versions:
“The first is that it points up an element of unclarity in the usual ‘monotheoretic’ formulations of” Gödel’s
Second Incompleteness Theorem. “In such formulations, some of the references to T are references to
it in its capacity as representing theory while others are references to it in its capacity as represented
theory. The justification of the Derivability Conditions requires a clear demarcation of these roles. A
justifiable constraint on the representing theory of a representational scheme can not generally be expected
to be a justifiable constraint on the represented theory of that scheme, and vice versa. The justification
of representational constraints therefore generally requires a distinction between the representing and
represented theories of a representational scheme.” (The emphasizes are Detlefsen’s [2]). “The second
reason the representing vs. represented theory distinction is important for our purposes is that ... certain
applications ... require that we allow the two to be different. The particular application we have in mind
is the application of [Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem] to the evaluation of Hilbert’s Program. It
requires that we allow the representing theory to become as weak as (some codification of) finitary reasoning
while, at the same time, allowing the represented theory to be as strong as the strongest classical theory
that possesses the type of instrumental virtues for which Hilbert generally prized classical mathematics
(e.g., various systems of set theory). If the [Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem] phenomenon were
to hold only for some environments containing finitary reasoning, and not for all of them, it would not
be legitimate to take it as refuting Hilbert’s Program because it would not then be an invariant feature
of all (proper) representational environments. Justifications of the [Derivability Conditions] must therefor
be valid not only in the monotheoretic settings but also in the appropriate bitheoretic settings.”
Let us now list the bitheoretic derivability conditions of [2] for two theories S (which is intended to
be as weak as possible–representing finitary mathematics) and T (which is intended to be as strong as
possible–representing ideal mathematics):
(Bi) S ` PrT (pϕq) whenever T ` ϕ;
(Bii) S ` PrT (pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrT (pϕq)→ PrT (pψq)
]
;
(Biii) S ` PrT (pϕq)→ PrS(pPrT (pϕq)q);
(Biv) S ` PrS(pϕq)→ PrT (pϕq);
(Bv) S ` G ←→ ¬PrT (pG q) for some sentence G .
Then Detlefsen’s Bi-G2 Lemma ([2], p. 48) proves that S ` Con(T ) −→ G , which then implies Gödel’s
Second Incompleteness Theorem by classical reasoning: for S ⊆ T we have S 6` G (by Gödel’s first
incompleteness theorem) and so S 6` Con(T ); which exactly negates Hilbert’s Program: the consistency of
ideal mathematics cannot be proved by finitary means.
3.2 Arithmetical Theories: Minding P’s and Q’s
Despite of the fact that usually Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is proved for Peano’s Arithmetic PA,
it holds for very weak fragments of PA. It is interesting to note that by the techniques of Gödel’s theorem
PA is proved to be non-finitely axiomatizable (see e.g. [4]). But a magical theory, called Robinson’s
Arithmetic and denoted by Q, was introduced in [14] which has the following properties:
• Q is finite: Q = PA− {all induction axioms}+ ∀x∃y[x = 0 ∨ x = S(y)];
• Q is Σ1-complete: Σ1-Th(N) ⊆ Q;
• Q is essentially undecidable (i.e., re-incompletable): every re and consistent extension of it is (un-
decidable and) incomplete.
The existence of a finitely axiomatized and undecidable theory immediately implies Church’s (and Turing’s)
theorem on the undecidability of first order logic (giving a negative answer to the Entscheidungsproblem).
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Remark 3.1 The somewhat mysterious symbol Q for this theory actually comes from its origin [14] where
(it was first introduced and) Peano’s Arithmetic was denoted by P (nowadays shown by PA), and the letter
after P is of course Q. There is still another theory (with lots of interesting properties) called (again)
Robinson’s Arithmetic, denoted by R, and its R (having nothing to do with Robinson) just follows Q in
the alphabet letters. G
Gödel-Rosser’s (stronger) Incompleteness Theorem can be stated as “no consistent and re extension of Q
is Π1-deciding”, where a theory T is called Γ-deciding, for a class Γ of formulas, when for any φ ∈ Γ we
have either T ` φ or T ` ¬φ. In other words, the Gödel-Rosser theorem states that for any theory T :
Q ⊆ T & T ∈ Σ1 & Con(T ) =⇒ T 6∈ Π1-Deciding.
In the next (final) subsection we will present a theory Q′ such that for any theory T :
Q′ ⊆ T & T ∈ Σ1 & Con(T ) =⇒ T 6` Con(T ).
3.3 Second Thoughts on Second Theorem
Let us have another look at the derivability conditions from semantic point of view. As was mentioned
before, proving them to hold in a particular theory could be difficult, but it is not too difficult to see right
away that the followings hold:
(i’) if T ` ϕ then N |= PrT (pϕq) (and so Q ` PrT (pϕq));
(ii’) N |= PrU(pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrU(pϕq)→ PrU(pψq)
]
for any re theory U ;
(iii’) N |= σ → PrU(pσq) for any Σ1-sentence σ and any re theory U ⊇ Q.
Now, define
Q′ = Q ∪ {PrU(pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrU(pϕq)→ PrU(pψq)
] | U is an re theory}
∪ {σ → PrU(pσq) | σ is a Σ1-sentence and U ⊇ Q is an re theory}.
By what was said above it is clear that N |= Q′. And what was promised at the end of the last subsection
can be proved rather easily:
Theorem 3.2 (Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem) For any consistent and re extension T
of Q′ we have T 6` Con(T ).
Let us postpone the proof for a moment, and pause more on Q′. It would not be much of use if this
theory were not re. So, let us prove this very important fact before the main theorem:
Proposition 3.3 The theory Q′ is re.
Proof. Trivially, Q, being a finite theory, is re; and the class of all re theories is re, so is the class
{PrU(pϕ→ ψq)→
[
PrU(pϕq)→ PrU(pψq)
] | U ∈Σ1}. It remains to show that the class {σ → PrU(pσq) |
σ∈Σ1-Sent. & Q⊆U ∈Σ1} is re too. Again, the class of all Σ1-sentences is re and so is the class of Σ1
theories; the finiteness of Q implies that the condition Q⊆U is equivalent to U ` ∧ Q (where ∧ Q denotes
the conjunction of the finitely many axioms of Q) which is an re property (by a proof-search algorithm).
Thus σ∈Σ1-Sent. & Q⊆U ∈Σ1 (for given sentence σ and set of sentences U) is an re condition as well. o
So, we see that again the finiteness of the magical theory Q is essential for the recursive enumerability
of Q′; if Q were not finite then the condition Q ⊆ U would not be re (for given re theory U). And
unfortunately, this is the best we can show for this theory. It would have been another magic to have Q′
finitely axiomatized, or at least have a finitely axiomatized theory containing it. Indeed, there exists a
finitely axiomatized theory that contains Q′, and that is IΣ1, the fragment of PA whose induction axioms
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are restricted to Σ1 formulas (see e.g. [4]). But neither the finite axiomatizability of IΣ1 nor the fact that
IΣ1 ` Q′ are easy to show (see the delicate proofs in e.g. [4]). So, the following easy proof could be difficult
if one wishes to show T ` Q′ for a particular theory T.
Proof.(of Theorem 3.2) By Gödel-Carnap Diagonal Lemma there exists an arithmetical sentence G
such that Q ` G ←→ [PrT (pG q) → ⊥]. The sentence G is equivalent to a Π1-sentence and actually
could be taken to be Π1. Now, T 6` G , since otherwise (if T ` G then) Q ` PrT (pG q) and so Q ` ¬G
whence (by T ⊇ Q′ ⊇ Q) T ` ¬G , contradicting the consistency of T . Now, as ¬G ∈ Σ1 we have
Q′ ` ¬G → PrT (p¬G q) (noting that T is an re theory containing Q). So,
(†) Q′ ` ¬PrT (p¬G q)→ G .
On the other hand, by classical logic we have ` ¬G → [G → ⊥], which, by the definition of Q′, implies
that Q′ ` PrT (p¬G q)→
[
PrT (pG q)→ PrT (p⊥q)
]
, so
(‡) Q′ ` ¬PrT (p⊥q) −→ ¬PrT (pG q)
∨¬PrT (p¬G q).
Now, by G ’s property we have Q′ ` ¬PrT (pG q)→ G and by (†) above Q′ ` ¬PrT (p¬G q)→ G . Whence,
(‡) implies that Q′ ` ¬PrT (p⊥q) −→ G , or Q′ ` Con(T ) −→ G . The desired conclusion T 6` Con(T )
follows from T 6` G proved above. o
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